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Gogama derailment report update: CN says it's invested $400M in infrastructure since 2015 crash

Transportation Safety Board issues report on 2015 derailment that led to explosions and oil spill

Updated at 2:10 p.m. Aug. 3: CN Rail has issued a statement to media following the release of a Transportation Safety Board of Canada report today on the 2015 derailment in Gogama that led to fires, explosions and the contamination of the Makami River after more than two million gallons of crude petroleum spilled from ruptured tanker cars.

In the statement, CN spokesperson Patrick Waldron said the company has spent $400 million on rail infrastructure throughout Northern Ontario since the 2015 derailments. That includes laying 200 miles of new rail.

Waldron also states the company continues work to clean up the Makami River, saying the company will stay to continue rehabilitation work and will stay for years after to monitor the situation.

The full statement from CN is below:

Safety is a core value at CN, and we learn from each incident. Our goal is to be the safest railroad in North America. This was very unfortunate incident, the result of a broken rail, and we apologize to the residents of Gogama and the Mattagami First Nation for the impacts to their community. 

Following the 2015 incidents, CN took a series of concrete actions to improve safety in Northern Ontario and across CN’s network, including implementing stronger engineering standards for such rail repairs and inspections, better track maintenance processes for similar work tasks, and improved classroom and field training for all track workers. 

Nearly 450 track supervisors and track workers have gone through enhanced classroom and hands-on field training to provide them expanded knowledge and tools to better identify track issues and properly complete necessary repairs. Among those tools are enhanced critical task checklists for various track repairs and maintenance, including dye penetrant tests.   

We have expanded our use of technology to analyze, monitor and inspect track across the CN network. We continue to invest to maintain, improve and protect our infrastructure. Since 2015, CN has invested nearly $400 million in our rail infrastructure across Northern Ontario, including installing 200 miles of new rail. 

CN remains committed to the environmental cleanup of the Makami River and surrounding area and will not leave until that cleanup is complete and then will continue to monitor conditions for many years. 

We’ve provided the community regular updates throughout the clean-up and monitoring process as we worked with world-renowned experts from across Canada and the United States to clean-up the spill and restore the natural habitat. 

This summer, environmental clean-up work is continuing at the Makami River site with the flushing of residual oil from the track embankment. River water quality testing results continue to meet strict government standards.

Original story

On March 7, 2015, a CN freight train hauling 94 tank cars loaded with crude oil jumped the tracks near Gogama, leading to an intense fire, explosions and the contamination of the nearby Makami River.

Today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) issued its report on how the crash occurred and what could be done to minimize the chances of a similar event happening in the future.

The derailment occurred in CN’s Ruel Subdivision. The train was travelling below the 50 mph speed limit at the time of the crash. Of the 94 cars, 39 derailed, spilling about 2.6 million litres of crude petroleum. The oil ignited, causing several explosions, and flowed into nearby Makami River, contaminating it. A CN rail bridge was destroyed in the wreck, along with about 1,000 feet of track. There were no injuries.

According to the TSB report, two factors contributed to the derailment, which saw 39 cars derail, spilling 2.6 million litres of crude. One factor was what information Transport Canada gathers from rail companies and what it does with that data. The other factor is how CN trains workers responsible for inspecting and keeping the tracks in working order.

TSB Chair Kathy Fox said Transport Canada doesn’t always consider how rail surface conditions can deteriorate. Doing this would lead to more thorough and specific inspections of track health.

"By integrating data on these 'leading indicators' — which could be predictive of future rail failures — the targeted inspections would be better focused," said Fox.

So, while Canadian railways routinely inspect their tracks for defects and issues, gathering data that includes “leading indicators, such as localized surface collapse, rail end batter, and crushed heads,” Transport Canada doesn’t scoop up this information. It should, TSB said.

“Without it, the targeted TC track inspections simply won't be as effective as they otherwise could be,” Fox said. “This is the focus of the recommendation we issued today."

Three days prior to the derailment, a piece of track had been repaired by a CN worker. It was this repaired section of track that broke, causing the derailment.

The CN worker needed to repair a broken rail. The worker did this by cutting out the defective piece of rail and installing what’s called a plug rail in its place. Before installing the plug, the worker visually inspected the exposed ends of rail from where the broken section had been cut out. 

However, despite the fact that CN standards require it prior to completing a repair, the worker did not perform what’s called a dye penetrant test to find rail defects that are not always visible to the naked eye. 

Because the worker skipped the dye test, a vertical split head (which is a crack running top to bottom in the middle of a piece of rail) was not detected. What’s more, the points where the rail head ends met was mismatched, leaving a step between the pieces. 

The worker tried to make the step smoother by grinding the plug rail, but the grinding wasn’t sufficient and the step between the two rail heads remained. TSB said given the state of the repair, a mandatory "slow order," which would have required trains to reduce speed at this location, should have been issued. It wasn’t.

Through its investigation, TSB found CN's procedures for rail testing and installing plug rails were located in multiple manuals, instead of just one, making the necessary information difficult to find. As well, TSB found CN workers were not given checklists to complete to ensure all necessary steps for repair jobs and testing had been followed.

For instance, TSB found the worker who had done the repair was aware of the dye penetrant test, but had not performed it or seen it done during the course of his duties, and CN didn’t highlight the importance of the test, nor provide opportunities for practical hands-on training.

The March derailment was the second derailment of a CN freight train carrying oil in that area in a month. On Feb. 14, 2015, 29 cars on a 100-car CN train jumped the tracks 30 kilometres northwest of Gogama, causing a fire that burned for several days. TSB blamed insufficient training for CN track inspectors, who missed cracks in the track. 


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