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?We don?t want this to happen to anyone again?

BY KEITH LACEY [email protected] Gord Heffern was the most knowledgeable and skilled worker at IncoÂ?s nickel refinery when it came to operating and maintaining the high-pressure oxygen lines running in and out of the plant.
BY KEITH LACEY

Gord Heffern was the most knowledgeable and skilled worker at IncoÂ?s nickel refinery when it came to operating and maintaining the high-pressure oxygen lines running in and out of the plant.

When Heffern was killed, after being badly burned when the line caught fire and exploded, his co-workers and Inco officials were shocked.

Heffern was killed July 27, 2001, two days after being badly burned after turning a large valve to purge an oxygen line in preparation of a summer shutdown.

A coronerÂ?s inquest into HeffernÂ?s death heard an expert testify the fire started when hydrocarbon grease ignited in a mechanism attached to the valve. This kind of grease should never have been used near an oxygen line.

It was also revealed the valve ordered by Inco officials was not the same one received and installed at the nickel refinery. Inco had ordered a stainless steel valve which is not as easily susceptible to igniting under intense heat created in oxygen pipelines.

Instead, the company received a Â?cast steelÂ? valve that had not been properly cleaned as the investigation revealed highly-flammable hydrocarbon grease was in abundance near the valve.

The stainless steel valve ordered was about $17,000, but the cast steel valve shipped to Sudbury cost about $6,000.

HeffernÂ?s family hopes now that so many questions have been answered, no one else will have to lose their life like their beloved son, brother and uncle did.

Alex Heffern, GordÂ?s brother, who represented his family so admirably during a difficult week-long inquest that wrapped up Friday at the Sudbury courthouse, was extremely pleased with the 10 recommendations the three-man, two-woman jury made.

Acknowledging Inco has acted responsibly to implement most of the recommendations already, Heffern said he and his family hope all recommendations will be adopted to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again.

The inquest Â?was very difficult, but very rewardingÂ? as many questions the family had in relation to the terrible accident have been answered.

Â?We had almost all of the questions we had lingering over the past three years answered.Â?

The inquest Â?has given the family a real sense of peace,Â? he said.

If the most knowledgeable man in the entire plant could be killed, itÂ?s obvious intensive training is necessary for every employee who works near high-pressure oxygen lines, said Heffern.

Â?We donÂ?t want this to happen to anyone again,Â? he said.

Inco officials have been very helpful to the family since the accident and have gone out of their way to implement as many changes as quickly as possible to ensure a similar tragedy doesnÂ?t reoccur, said Heffern.

Nickel Refinery supervisor Dale Krueger said the inquest has proven there were Â?gaps in our knowledgeÂ? and the company plans on acting on all jury recommendations to ensure a similar accident never happens again.

The inquest heard the valve in question had not been moved or used in almost six years after being installed.

Mike Comeau, group leader at the nickel refinery, said the valve in question was discussed many times at meetings preparing for summer shutdown. He agreed Â?no one knew more about oxygen lines than Gord.Â?

The juryÂ?s recommendations included:

- Inco undertaking a company-wide audit of its oxygen systems, which would ensure compliance with best practices, legislation, guidlines, standards, regulations and management of change principles. If there are no changes, an annual audit should be conducted.

- Inco should provide mandatory, company-wide training to all levels of personnel associated with his pressure oxygen systems with the best industry standards and practices. Such training should include the testing of employees after completion of the program and issuing certificates to qualified personnel.

- Inco should ensure through training, employees are instructed on established procedures related to all non-routine hazardous tasks associated with the oxygen system.

- Inco should develop a process to ensure comprehensive communication between producers, operaters and consumers of the oxygen system regarding planning, installation, maintenance and operation.

- Inco should create and maintain an electronic inventory of all components within the oxygen system, which would include description, location, installation, information, operational use, procurement information and maintenance records at a minimum and ensure easy access of this inventory to all employees.

- Inco should post proper signs on all oxygen valves to ensure the safety of these employees when operating them.

- Inco should develop and implement such procedures as may be necessary in order to ensure the verification of all oxygen equipment ordered against all oxygen equipment received and to otherwise comprehensively deal with all materials handling issues including procurement, receiving and warehousing.

- Inco should provide dedicated, immediate access to properly equipped emergency vehicles for their emergency response personnel, as well as ensuring such personnel are also equipped with appropriate radio communication devices.